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Abstract 
This paper analyses drivers of imports during the major world trade collapses 
of the Great Depression (1930s; 34 countries) and the Great Recession (1930s; 
173 countries). The analysis deals with the first year of these episodes and 
develops a small empirical model that shows a significant impact of the 
development of GDP, the share of manufacturing goods in total imports and 
the political system. The analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity with respect 
to regional importance of these drivers.   
Keywords 




The study of world trade collapses has many merits. A better understanding of 
the causes and impact of collapsing world trade is relevant for science because 
these unique “real world experiments” provide a useful (yet extreme) testing 
ground for theories. Policy makers will be interested because they can learn to 
improve resilience against trade shocks, including designing global institutions 
that can prevent or reduce the impact of such shocks. Following van Bergeijk 
(2009) and Constantinescu et al. (2015), this paper focuses on import demand, 
in particular on the country-level import experience during the first year of a 
collapse of a world trade. We will follow the usual approach and define a world 
trade collapse as an event of negative annual real growth of international 
merchandise trade that occurs both in the aggregate for world trade and in 
almost all countries for their individual imports and/or exports.1 World trade 
collapses are relatively unique historical phenomena: in the period 1880-2010 
only about 12 per cent of the real annual growth rates of world trade was 
negative and the overall trend of global trade with the exception of the 1930s 
has been positive (van Bergeijk 2010, pp 6-12).  
Economists quickly understood that the 2008/9 world trade collapse 
stood out as an exceptional event. Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) estimated 
that the world trade collapse in the first year of the 2008−2009 trade collapse 
                                                 
* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the workshop Heterogeneous 
resilience: what can we learn from the regional impact of shocks?, The Hague, October 
2014. Comments by Steven Brakman, Paul Hilhorst and participants are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1 A trade collapse (negative growth for world trade) is to be distinguished from the 
recent trade slow-down (see e.g. World Bank 2015) that referes to a sitution where trade 
is growing slower than the historical trend and slower than GDP. 
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was even stronger than the decline that occurred in the similar phase of the Great 
Depression. Araúlo and Oliveira-Martins (2009) pointed out the exceptionally 
synchronized character of this downturn. When the 2008/9 trade collapse 
progressed it became clear that its evolution differed in the sense that (compared 
to the trade collapse in the 1930s) a relatively quick restoration to pre-crisis levels 
of world trade could be observed. This paper takes a closer look at the first phase 
of global trade collapse. We think that it is necessary to focus on the first year 
because the policy errors in the 1930s led to a long-lasting and destructive 
episode. This is true in terms of both its duration (Figure 1) and its decline 
(Figure 2). The trade destruction in the Great Depression, however, came in later 
years mainly as a result of protectionism and inappropriate monetary policies 
(Kindleberger 1973). Focussing on the first year of the wold trade collapses will 
tell us something about the initial ‘policy free’ impact.  
FIGURE 1 
 Duration of peak to trough movement of real and nominal export and trade 






















































































b) 2000s  
 
 
The first contribution of this paper is that it provides a data set for the 1930s 
and 2000s that is used to develop a succinct empirical model that describes the 
first year of two world trade collapses reasonably well. This is relevant because 
the underlying analysis of the 2008/9 trade collapse is by and large based on 
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empirical analyses of post Second World War data only. There are a few studies 
that deal simultaneously with both the 1930s and 2000s world trade collapse, but 
these studies are either descriptive (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009 and 
updates), based on very preliminary data (Campbel et al 2009) or deal with only 
a handful of bilateral trade relations in the 1930s so that it is difficult to see how 
this can be generalized to the world trade collapse phenomenon in general 
(Eaton et al. 2011). The vast majority of the available studies do not attempt to 
cover the 1930s and essentially compare the usual fluctuations in international 
trade (as observed in the post second world war period) to the exceptional trade 
collapse in 2008-9 and derive stylized facts from the recent past only, even when 
the stated objective is to provide a ‘historical perspective’ (e.g. Freund 2009 and 
Hong, Lee and Tang 2009). The literature that deals with the trade collapse in 
the 1930s has also generally speaking not taken other episodes of declining global 
trade volumes into account. The literature in the past of course could not (yet) 
consider the trade collapse of 2008-9, but even so a detailed analysis of earlier 
episodes is not available (one obvious reason is that the collection of comparable 
data on international trade started in the 1910s and the multi-country sources 
available at the time of that research did not cover years prior to 1913; see 
Loveday 1921). Recent studies that include the 1930s also by choice appear to 
neglect the 2008-9 period (e.g. Jacks et al. 2011). The motivation for this paper 
is to analyse the two major world trade collapses simultaneously, rather than 
treating each of them as a unique event. While this is a clear contribution to the 
literature it also comes at a cost (as we will discuss in more detail later on) 
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because it has an impact on methodology, in particular the level of analysis which 
can only be macro in nature due to the available data.2 
The empirical analysis will explore the substantial amount of cross-
country variations in the decline of nations’ import volumes. Our procedure 
provides a sufficient number of observations as the data set covers 34 economies 
in the 1930s and 173 economies in the 2000s. For these 207 cases a set of 
relevant variables was identified for which reliable and comparable data could 
be collected.3 Since we want to cover two periods in time that are very distinct, 
we are limited in our choice of comparable data. We relate the development of 
individual countries to three variables: the development of demand (the 
movement in their GDP), the share of manufactures in their imports and the 
political system. The second contribution of this paper is thus that we analyse 
heterogeneity induced by region and country specific drivers of the two major 
world trade collapses. 
Indeed, one of the eye-catching aspects of the world collapses is the quite 
different impact on individual countries (Tanaka 2009, Levchenko et al. 2010). 
At the aggregate level the most recent world trade collapse that reduced real 
global trade by some twenty per cent in only a few months appears to have been 
a short term phenomenon: by November 2011 real world imports had reached 
the April 2008 peak level again. This general picture clearly hides substantial 
heterogeneity, as illustrated in Figure 3. The trade recovery of Latin America and 
Emerging Asia was swift and import volumes in these regions by 
                                                 
2 See for examples of relevant analyses of the 2008/9 that use firm level data: 
3 Note, however, that the country coverage is not complete for all explanatory variables; 




 Real import development (monthly index numbers) 
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2  Drivers of  world trade collapse 
It is important to distinguish between on the one hand, the trigger of the world 
trade collapses and on the other hand, country or region specific factors that 
explain why the impact of that specific trigger has been heterogeneous.4 It is 
generally agreed that the most important country specific driver of the collapse 
of imports is the reduction in Gross Domestic Product (representing 
macroeconomic demand). Typically, the change in trade is expected to be a 
multiple of the change in GDP (Baldwin 2009, Freund 2009, WTO 2009). An 
important country specific determinant of this multiplier is the composition 
effect of international imports that is reflected by the different shares of 
manufacturing in trade and production. In addition to these two factors recent 
studies have linked the trade collapses to uncertainty (Grossman and Meissner 
2010, van Bergeijk 2010, Bloom 2014, Novy and Tailor 2014). It is not straight-
forward to analyse uncertainty in the context of the two world trade collapses. 
In earlier and related literatures, the relationship between trade and uncertainty 
has been modelled as a tax on trade (Anderson and Marcouiller 2002) or as 
quantitative uncertainty (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1976, van Marrewijk 1992). 
Both approaches have clear merits but are difficult to operationalize in the 
context of the two events that we study. We therefore will follow a somewhat 
different approach and assume that country specific characteristics determine 
                                                 
4 Many factors have been suggested as triggers, including the negative demand shock, a 
rise in protectionism, a lack of trade finance and an increase in uncertainty (Auboin 
2009, Baldwin 2009, WTO 2009, van Bergeijk 2010). The evidence for protectionism 
and lacking trade finance as causes for the trade collapse is weak (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
2009, p. 10, Estevadoreal 2003, Freund 2009, Baldwin and Evenett 2009, Estevadeordal 
et al. 2003,  Eichengreen and Irwin 2009, Niculcea et al 2011). Likewise, the 
fragmentation of production does not seem to have played a great role in the first phase 
of the 2000s trade collapse (Boz et al. 2014, van Bergeijk, 2013). 
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the differential impact of a global trade uncertainty shock, be it in the Great 
Depression or the Great Recession. This is the motivation to take a closer look 
at the institutional country specific context which we will operationalize by the 
political system. This choice fits well into the approach followed by Van 
Marrewijk and van Bergeijk (1990 and 1993) and Di Malo and Valente (2013). 
Van Marrewijk and van Bergeijk (1990 and 1993) develop a comparative static 
model to analyse the impact of decision-making under uncertainty. They point 
out a coordination failure in decentralized decision-making that leads 
decentralized economies ceteris paribus too trade more than centralized 
economies.  Di Malo and Valente (2013) extend the analysis of this coordination 
failure in a dynamic model with comparable results. As decentralized economies 
will ceteris paribus trade more, a decentralized economy will experience a 
stronger reduction of trade during a collapse. This effect is different from the 
developing literature on the impact of institutions on comparative advantage (see 
for a review Nunnand and Treflert, 2014) that argues that institutions can help 
to shape comparative advantage. The van Marrewijk - van Bergeijk - Di Malo - 
Valente argument is that the extent of decentralization in decision making 
determines the extent to which a country trades internationally; it is not about 
factors that shape comparative advantage but about the extent to which a 
country actually uses its comparative advantage to trade. This relationship 
between trade level and political institutions is also supported by other 
approaches. Democratic countries tend to have more liberal trade policies 
(Milner and Kubota (2005), which may reflect the voting power of labour in a 
democracy (O’Rourke 2006) but could possibly also reflect that ‘trade is less 
threatening to individuals who have confidence in their country’s political 
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institutions’ (Mayda and Rodrik 2005, p.  1410). Moreover, several authors have 
pointed out that autocratic, centrally-planned economies, due to their centralized 
decision-making processes, will respond quicker and sharper to (potential) trade 
problems. Aidt and Gassebner (2007) develop an argument in which the 
possibility of a dictatorial ruler to extract rents by imposing trade distortions is 
the driving mechanism (and additionally they argue that control and monitoring 
of trade policies are less well developed in autocracies). Discussing the choice of 
instrumental variables in their study on the drivers behind the tariff escalation in 
the 1930s, Eichengreen and Irwin (2009, p. 26) point out that authoritarian 
political regimes can be expected to resort to restrictions of economic exchange.  
In conclusion, the literature suggests three potentially relevant country 
specific drivers of import collapse that we can empirically test for the 1930s 
and 2000s: the change in GDP, the composition of imports and the political 
institutional system. 
3 Measurement 
As the purpose of this paper is to analyse two events that are far apart in 
time, special consideration needs to be given to the fact that the data need to be 
reasonable comparable over a period of eighty years. Moreover, some variables 
that may be relevant for the world trade collapse may not be available. An 
example is trade credit for which the series has been discontinued just a few 
years before the trade collapse in 2008 (Auboin 2009). It is also important to 
realize that measurement errors can be a serious problem in the present study. 
It is well known that many economic observations, in particular regarding the 
key variables of interest in the present study (volumes of imports and 
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production) are often measured imprecisely (Morgenstern 1950, Frederico and 
Tena 1991 and Van Bergeijk 1995). This is especially relevant because we use a 
blend of recent data and data from the 1930s that were collected with less 
advanced methods as compared to the recent data. As a practical way to reduce 
the extent of measurement error corruption we use aggregate trade data basically 
because this reduces misclassification by commodity and/or country (compare 
Eaton et al.  2011, Appendix A on their classification problems for the 1930s). 
Moreover, we use wherever possible sources that cover the full period or which 
have been constructed in the same ‘tradition’ of data collection and statistics 
production.5 
3.1 Volume of imports6  
Trade volume data for the 1930s are not readily available for all countries. Three 
data sources provide the necessary data for the annual volume of imports of 
individual countries. Our main source is a data set compiled by the UN Statistical 
Office (1962). The data set provides index numbers for the volume of trade, but 
not for all countries.7 The UN’s draft paper reports data on the volume of 
imports for: Australia (Table III), Austria (Table IV), Canada (Table VII), Chile 
                                                 
5 An example is the League of Nation data on the manufacturing share (1931) that as discussed 
in section 3 are clearly related to the data in the UN (1962) draft paper that was published under 
the aegis of the UN division that is also responsible for the data source that we use for the 
manufacturing import share in 2008-09. 
6 These sources have also been used in the construction of Figures 1 and 2. 
7 It is also important to note that the official status of the data is unclear. An accompanying note 
states: This publication is only available as a draft paper and it is indicated that “The data 
contained in the present paper should be regarded as preliminary, it is requested that no use be 
made of them until final publication.” Yet, the paper appears to be based on solid research and 
it is the best source for historical data available to us. Nevertheless this information is provided 
without assuming any responsibility for the accuracy of the data and only as a special service to 
interested users which can use this data under their own responsibility and according to their 
own judgment. Source: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/historical_data.htm, dated April 
28, 2009. 
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(Table VIII), Denmark (Table IX), Finland (Table X), France (Table XI), 
Germany (Table XII), India (Table XIII), Italy (Table XIV), Japan (Table XV), 
the Netherlands (Table XVI), New Zealand (Table XVII), Norway (Table 
XVII), South Africa (Table XIX), Sweden (Table XX), Switzerland (Table XXI), 
the United Kingdom (Table XXII) and the United States (Table XXIII). The 
second data source for the 1930s is Maddison (1995, Tables A6 and A12, p. 87 
and p. 90) who provides index numbers for real imports for Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Formosa (Taiwan), Indonesia and Mexico. The third data 
source is Birnberg and Resnick (1975) that provide trade data on Ceylon (Sri 
Lanka) (Table A1), Chile (Table A6), Cuba (Table A11), Egypt (Table A 16), 
India (Table A21), Jamaica (Table A26), Nigeria (Table A31), Philippines (Table 
A36)  and Thailand (Table A46). For the 2000s, we use the 2008/9 percent 
decrease of real imports of goods (published in the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2014). We analyse imports of goods rather than imports of 
goods and services because the data for the 1930s relate to goods. The 
implication is that the analysis does not deal with the developments of trade in 
services which are important flows for many countries in the 2000s. 
3.2 Real GDP (per cent change and pre-crisis per capita 
level)  
For the percent change of real GDP in 2008-09 we use the local currency 
constant price GDP growth rates published in the IMF World Economic Outlook 
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Database October 2014. For the 1930s we rely on Maddison’s historical series.8 
This is the data set of Angus Maddison’s Statistics on World Population, GDP and 
Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD and an update from Maddison 2006. This source is 
also known as “Maddison’s historical series” and is available from the website 
of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre www.ggdc.net. This source 
is also used for the pre-crisis level of GDP per capita (in 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars) in the 1930s and the 2000s. The clear benefit of this procedure 
is that we have a consistent indicator for the level of development. Maddison is 
the only available source for internationally comparable per capita income that 
covers the countries for which we were able to obtain the import volume 
indicators and for both periods. The level of per capita GDP is measured in the 
year before the start of the trade collapse in 1928 and 2008 respectively.9 
3.3 Manufacturing import share  
The manufacturing share is measured in the year before the start of the trade 
collapse, so in 1928 and 2008 and the shares are based on values reported in 
international sources.10 For the inter bellum two sources are available based on 
the work of the statistical office of the League of Nations: the draft report by 
the UN Statistical Office (1962) that provides the value for manufactured goods 
                                                 
8 For South Africa and Egypt I used the Barro-Ursúa Macroeconomic Data set 
available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-
macroeconomic-data. 
9 For Cuba and China no data are available for 1928 so here the 1929 data where used. 
Maddison does not provide GDP for South Africa in the inter bellum. 
10 For Cuba the year of observation is 1927, the last pre-crisis year for which a Group 
IV share has been published. 
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and the value of the total of merchandise imports for 21 countries11 and League 
of Nations (1931, Table 95, pp. 168-170) that reports percentage shares of trade 
for “Group IV Manufactured Articles”. The League of Nations (1931) covers 
18 countries for which we have data on real import decline (see Section 2.1) and 
overlap with UN (1962) for 14 countries.12 The statistical relationship between 
the two sources for the overlapping countries is highly significant and almost all 
variance is explained by a simple regression (which suggests that the sources 
differ by a constant factor related to a definitional or measurement issue): 
Manufacturing share according to UN = 0.88*Group IV according to LoN + 9.2   
R2=0.98, F=1074, N = 14. Using this equation, four additional observations can 
be constructed for the manufacturing share of China, Cuba, Indonesia and 
Mexico so that for the 1930s data are available for potentially 25 countries. For 
Colombia and Formosa (Taiwan) none of the necessary data are available. The 
data for the manufacturing share of imports in the 2000s are straight-forward 
and measured as the share of the categories SITC 6, 7 and 8 in total imports (in 
per cent and for the year 2008) and derived from United Nations (2010). 
3.4 Political variables  
We use the Polity IV dataset describes the political system of the economy 
(Marshall 2011, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). It is 
noteworthy that some authors, e.g., Taylor and Wilson 2006, also use the Polity 
                                                 
11 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
12 Austria, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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data as indicators for the quality of institutions. Polity IV contains operational 
indicators of institutionalized authority characteristics and annually codes nine 
democracy and autocracy sub-indicators. In order to test robustness we will also 
use a second data: the Vanhanen data set (Vanhanen, 2011, 
http://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/) 
that contains data on political participation and democratization. We use his 
Index of democratization that is defined as the product of these underlying 
indicators. One problem with these datasets is that they do not provide scores 
for colonies. This may be especially relevant since India and Indonesia were 
colonies (of England and the Netherlands, respectively) in the 1930s and 
important trading nations. Following Easterley (2005, p. 13), we will also use the 
lowest democracy rating for the countries in our sample as an alternative for the 
regressions without colonies in order to  provide a check on robustness.  
3.5 Comparability between periods  
For pre-crisis per capita GDP, population and the political variables the necessary 
data are available from one source so that the consistency and the comparability 
for these variables is guaranteed. In all other cases several sources had to be 
combined and although the sources measure the same economic concept and 
sensible procedures were followed to arrive at comparable data still a number of 
potential problems should be flagged because they may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the findings in the next sections. Import volume changes have 
been taken from four sources and while methodologies to derive the change in 
import volume may have changed over time the data for the 1930s are from  
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authoritative sources and appear quite comparable. The manufacturing share in 
imports was derived from three sources and although all sources are from the 
statistical office of the United Nations and its predecessor at the League of 
Nations procedures, definitions, data collection and coverage have changed. The 
shares reported in the two League of Nations sources, as discussed, differ by a 
constant factor and show a high correlation so that we are confident about the 
use of the League of Nation data, but the comparability with the data for 2008 
can cause problems given that many revisions of product classification have 
occurred over the past 80 years.  So while a lot of effort was put in collecting 
and/or constructing comparable data, it is still important to note that differences 
are likely and finding therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Therefore 
extensive robustness checking is necessary and this will be provided in the next 
section. 
4. Empirical findings 
The aim of this section is to build on the reviewed literature in the previous 
section and to develop a small, but robust empirical model for the two trade 
collapses. The choice for a small model is motivated by the limited number of 
observations and by the availability of data for both periods. Table 1 and 2 report 




4.1 General results 
The first step is to estimate the core model and test if the model is able to 
describe the trade collapse data for the 1930s and 2000s. Table 3 reports the 
findings of the model with (line 1) and without (line 2) a shift dummy for the 
1930s. The value of adj-R2 (corrected for degrees of freedom) is a bit low, but 
acceptable for this kind of research that covers historic and contemporaneous 







Table 2 Correlation matrix 
 










AUTOC -0.83 0.27 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.94 0.17 -0.66 0.22 
DEMOC 
 
-0.35 0.32 0.15 0.22 -0.03 0.97 -0.11 0.81 -0.31 
GDPGR 
 
-0.24 -0.19 -0.28 0.02 -0.33 0.11 -0.33 0.46 
GDPPC 
   
0.16 0.20 0.30 0.22 -0.11 0.54 -0.23 
GDPSHARE 
   
0.86 -0.28 0.11 0.45 0.13 -0.11 
IMPORTSHARE 
    
-0.37 0.18 0.35 0.20 -0.17 
MANUFIMPSHARE 
     
-0.01 -0.20 0.08 -0.09 
POLITY 
       
-0.14 0.78 -0.28 
POPULATIONSHARE 
       
-0.12 0.02 
VANHANEN 














Autocracy score 1.8 0.0 0 10 2.8 
Democracy score 5.9 7.0 0 10 3.8 
Real GDP growth -0.3% -0.6% -17.7% 20.6% 5.5 
GDPPC in 1000$ 11.9 4.3 0.2 112.4 18.2 
GDP share 0.0% 0.08% 0.00% 0.24% 0.03 
Import share 0.9% 11.6% 0.0% 15.1% 2.0 
Manufacturing share in imports 62.3% 64.1% 22.8% 89.8% 13.6 
Population share 0.00% 0.16% 0.00% 0.27% 0.03 
Vanhanen index 16.7 16.1 0 44.9 11.9 
Real import growth -6.8% -9.6% -47.7% 129.0% 17.9 
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without outliers, i.e. more than 20% change in import volume. Line (4) reports 
the findings with regional fixed effects). Importantly, the coefficients of the 
variables of interests are significant at the 95% level and better, and confirm to 
a priori expectations. The dummy variable for the 1930s turns out to be 
insignificant.13 All in all, the model performs satisfactorily.  
 
 
The next step is to test this model for the robustness of the inclusion of the 
political variable. Therefor the table reports results for alternative political 
                                                 
13 See Table 6 below for a specification that includes slope dummies 
Table 3 OLS estimates of the basic model for two trade collapses and alternative political indicators.  












R2 R2 adj F 
(1) 142 1.2*** -0.2* -0.8** -2.1 8.3 0.25 0.22 11*** 
  (4.8) (-2.0) (-2.3) (-0.6) (0.2)    
(2) 142 1.3*** -0.1** -0.8**  6.3 0.24 0.23 15*** 
  (4.8) (-2.1) (-2.3)  (1.2)    
(3) 117 0.8*** -0.1** -0.7***  5.4 0.33 0.31 20*** 
  (5.1) (-2.4) (-3.0)  (1.4)    
(4) 142 1.0*** -0.2* -1.0* -2.4 FE 0.31 0.25  
  (3.8) (-1.7) (-1.8) (-0.7)     
    AUTOC      
(5) 142 1.4*** -0.1* 0.7  -0.1 0.23 0.21 14*** 
  (5.0) (-1.9) (1.3)  (-0.0)    
(6) 173 1.4***  1.3**  -8.5*** 0.23 0.22 25*** 
  (5.2)  (2.8)  (-6.9)    
    POLITY      
(7) 142 1.3*** -0.1** -0.4*  3.2 0.24 0.22 14*** 
  (4.9) (-2.0) (-1.9)  (0.7)    
(8) 173 1.3***  -0.6***  -3.7* 0.24 0.23 26*** 
  (5.0)  (-2.7)  (-1.9)    
    VANHANEN      
(9) 158 1.2*** -0.1 -0.2**  1.7 0.23 0.21 15*** 
  (4.7) (-1.4) (-2.3)  (0.4)    
(10) 192 1.3***  -0.3***  -2.2 0.22 0.21 26*** 
  (5.0)  (-2.9)  (-1.0)    
 
Notes 
(White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance in brackets) 
* 90% confidence level 
** 95% confidence level 
*** 99% confidence level 
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variables: two variables that like the democracy score are based on the Polity IV 
data set (the Autocracy score and Polity, that combines the democracy and 
autocracy scores) and one variable from the Measures of Democracy dataset (the 
Vanhanen index). We report these variables with and without the share of 
manufacturing in imports; the latter helps us to increase the number of available 
observations from 142 to 173. (Table 4 clarifies that depending on the included 
variables the data set may vary and shows the countries included and excluded 
in the different subsamples.) It is noteworthy that these variables measure 
different aspects of the political system of a country (namely its position in the 
continuum from autocracy to democracy and the extent of political participation 
and competition, respectively). The findings therefore clearly show that the 
finding for the political system is robust (also note that the findings for the 
Vanhanen-index are obtained for different slightly samples and sample sizes).14   
All in all the equation is able to explain 25% of the variation in the import 
collapse. The coefficients of the core variables are significant and the core model 
is significant in what it explains as shown by the F test. These findings appear to 
be robust for different measures for political systems. The next question is to 
take a closer look at the heterogeneity at the level of continents/regions.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Vanhanen covers somewhat more small countries (all observations for the 2000s) 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Dominica, Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, 




Table 4 Data availability and (sub) samples 




Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United 






Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, 
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea South, Kuwait, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, 
Thailand, The Gambia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
No data on 
GDP growth 
Korea, Philippines, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Formosa, 
Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam, Grenada, Kiribati, Palau, The Bahamas 




Colombia, Egypt Angola, Bangladesh, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kosovo, Lao 
P.D.R., Liberia, Libya, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, 
Papua New Guinea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, 
Swaziland, Taiwan Province of China, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen 
No data on 
Democracy 
score 
India, Indonesia Afghanistan, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Hong Kong SAR, 
Iceland, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Tonga 
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4.2  Geographical heterogeneity 
Before turning to the analysis geographical heterogeneity in the trade collapses, 
Table 5 for ease of exposition first repeats the results for the full sample. 
 
 
Table 5 OLS estimates of the basic model for two trade collapses (Regional analyses) 







R2 R2adj F 
(1) 142 1.3*** -0.1** -0.8** 0.24 0.23 15*** 
  (4.8) (-2.0) (-2.3)    
(2) 161 1.4*** -0.1*  0.21 0.20 21*** 
  (5.1) (-1.7)     
(3) 173 1.3***  -1.1*** 0.24 0.23 26*** 
  (4.8)  (-3.0)    
Africa 
(4) 45 0.8 -0.2 -1.5* 0.08 0.01 1.2 
  (1.1) (-1.1) (-1.8)    
(5) 49 1.0 -0.1  0.04 -0.00 0.9 
  (1.2) (-0.6)     
(6) 60 0.4  -1.4** 0.05 0.02 1.6 
  (0.5)  (-2.0)    
Asia and Oceania 
(7) 20 0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.14 -0.02 0.8 
  (1.0) (0.5) (-0.7)    
(8) 26 0.9*** -0.0  0.25 0.18 3.8** 
  (3.1) (-0.3)     
(9) 27 0.8  -1.4** 0.35 0.29 6.4*** 
  (1.6)  (-2.1)    
Europe 
(10) 37 1.7*** -0.0 -0.6 0.56 0.52 14*** 
  (4.7) (-0.6) (-1.1)    
(11) 41 1.4*** -0.1  0.63 0.61 32*** 
  (5.1) (-1.0)     
(12) 40 1.7***  -0.7** 0.55 0.53 22*** 
  (6.5)  (-2.4)    
Latin America and Caribbean 
(13) 25 1.1 -0.4** 0.2 0.33 0.24 3.5** 
  (1.1) (-2.2) (0.1)    
(14) 31 1.0 -0.3*  0.21 0.15 3.6** 
  (0.8) (1.8)     
(15) 28 0.8  1.3 0.18 0.12 2.7* 
  (0.8)  (1.0)    
Notes 
(White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance in brackets) 
* 90% confidence level 
** 95% confidence level 
*** 99% confidence level 
All equations were estimated with a constant term that is not reported here and was insignificant 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
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An equation always includes as an explanatory variable the development of GDP 
in the first crisis year and a constant term. (The constant term is not reported; it 
is always insignificant at the 90% confidence level.) Line (1) provides the results 
if we include both the share of manufacturing imports and the Democracy score 
in the model. Line (2) provides the result if we only include the share of 
manufacturing imports. Finally, line (3) provides the model with the Democracy 
score only. This structure of 3 regressions for different samples is followed in 
the rest of the table 
Next we proceed to investigate how the model performs at the 
regional/continental level. We take a look at Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin 
America and the Caribbean. These groupings provide sufficient observations for 
meaningful regressions. Looking at the findings by continent we see that at this 
level of geographical disaggregation no clear-cut evidence for the global trade 
model emerges. Even for the European continent, where adj-R2 is relatively high, 
the model is not fully replicated as the coefficient of the manufacturing share in 
imports is not significant. In Africa the evidence suggests a significant impact of 
the Democracy score, but the explanatory power of the equation is poor. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean the manufacturing share is significant and in 
Asia and Oceania the evidence is mixed. The point of these exercises is to show 
that the mainstream explanation of the global trade collapse ignores that patterns 
differ quite substantially.   
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4.3 Level of development and other robustness checks 
Table 6 provides a number of robustness checks. The first check (lines 1 to 5) 
relates to the level of development as measured by GDP per capita. If per capita 
GDP is added to the core model we find that its impact is insignificant (line 1). 
This is confirmed by lines (2) – (5) that report additional regressions for four per 
capita GDP intervals. Next lines 6 and 7 report an alternative country grouping 
where we combine the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and 
Europe (line 6) and the rest of the world (line 7). Next we estimate regressions 
that either include the Democracy score or the manufacturing share in imports 
for a common sample (that is the observations for which we know the values of 
both variables) Lines (8) and (9) of Table 6 can be compared to lines (2) and (3) 
in Table 5. The final three regressions in Table 6 take a look at the differences 
between the 1930s and the 2000s. Line (10) provides a multiplicative 
specification where we take logs of all variables. Before we can take logs we need 
to make two transformations. First, we add an arbitrary small number to the 
democracy score (namely 0.000001) so that it becomes strictly positive. Second, 
we limit ourselves to cases where both imports and GDP decrease so that we can 
analyse strictly positive numbers (that is the import crunch and the GDP 
crunch). Due to the transformations, the number of observations decreases to 
72. Lines (11) and (12) report the findings if we include colonies by assigning 
them the lowest democracy rating for the countries in our sample. Finally, we 
investigate the robustness across time. Line (13) reports a regression that 
includes shifts and slope dummies for the 1930s. The slope dummies are 
insignificant; the shift dummy is marginally significant at the 90% confidence 
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level. Line (14) reports the model for the 23 observations for the 1930s for which 
all data are available and line (15) does the same for the 2000s. 
 
  
Table 6 OLS estimates of the basic model for two trade collapses (Sensitivity analyses) 



























-0.0    0.25 0.22 11
*** 




-0.2 -1.7     0.17 0.10 2.7
* 






    0.23 0.14 2.6
* 




-0.0 0.1     0.40 0.35 8
*** 






    0.31 0.22 3.3
** 
  (3.7) (-0.3) (-1.8)        
North America, Europe, New Zealand, Australia 
(6) 45 1.4
*** 
-0.1 -0.4     0.46 0.42 12
*** 
  (4.0) (-0.7) (-0.80        







    0.20 0.17 8
*** 




-0.1      0.22 0.21 20
*** 





     0.24 0.22 21
*** 
  (5.0)  (-2.1)        
Multiplicative specification 
(10) 72 0.4*** -0.8* 0.02**     0.33 0.30 11
*** 
  (3.3) (-1.8) (2.1)        
Inclusion of colonies with zero value for democracy index 
(11) 144 1.3*** -0.1 -0.7**     0.24 0.22 15
***
 
  (5.1) (-1.5) (-1.9)        
(12) 180 1.3***  -0.9***     0.22 0.21 25
*** 
  5.1)  (-2.8)        
     Dummy 
1930s 









-0.1 0.2 1.7 0.26 0.23 7
*** 




0.0 0.6     0.32 0.21 3.0
*
 
  (1.8) (0.7) (0.9)        
2000s only 
(15) 120 1.2*** -0.2** -1.1***     0.25 0.23 13*** 
  (4.1) (-2.1) (-2.9)        
Notes: See Table 5 
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The conclusion of this section is that a small model for the two major 
global trade collapses identifies the demand shock, the manufacturing share in 
imports and the political system as significant determinants of the extent of 
import collapse. The empirical evidence is most conclusive for the demand 
shock that is highly significant (in view of line (7) in Table 6, the few exceptions 
in Table 5 in  the regional disaggregation are most probably resulting from the 
small sizes of the sub-samples). Also for the democracy score the evidence is 
strong as it is often significant at the 95% level and better and robust with respect 
to different definitions and aspects of the political system. Finally, while the 
evidence regarding the share of manufacturing evidence is convincing at the 
global level, it is less robust than the other two variables. Heterogeneity is thus 
important for understanding the drivers of the global trade collapse.  
5. Concluding remarks  
Clearly this paper is only a first step to analyse the heterogeneity of trade 
collapses. Future research may address this issue also for the smaller trade 
collapses that occurred in between the two big one’s that we studied in this 
paper. This paper provides support for the agreement amongst economists that 
the demand shock has been one of the main drivers of the world import 
collapses in the 1930s and the 2000s and in addition shows that this is an 
important factor that explains the heterogeneity that we observe in the import 
experiences of countries. Although the evidence is less clear for the trade 
composition effect (tested by the share of manufacturing in imports) in 
particular in the regional models, on balance the composition effect also seems 
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to be a relevant, but less significant, explanatory factor for the heterogeneity in 
observed import collapse heterogeneity.  
This is to the best of our knowledge the first paper to investigate the 
vulnerability of different political systems in the context of trade collapses. We 
uncovered an empirical regularity: the more democratic a political system the 
stronger the reduction of its imports. We relate this finding to an emerging 
literature that relates the world trade collapse to increased (trade) uncertainty. 
Obviously this factor cannot be investigated at the level of world trade and this 
provides a further argument to look at lower levels of aggregation and to take 
the heterogeneity of country experiences seriously. We also have studied 
heterogeneity at different levels of analysis (by income level and by region) and 
find substantial differences (our findings suggest that geographical heterogeneity 
may be more important than heterogeneity due to different levels of 
development). 
By focusing on the initial phase of the world trade collapses and 
providing a model that performs reasonable well, our findings provide 
corroborative evidence that the Great Depression and the Great Repression 
initially belonged to the same category but that different policy responses and 
global institutions made a difference. The optimistic implication is that world 
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